United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607 (1927)
Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES
v.
SULLIVAN.
No. 851.
Decided May 16, 1927.
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of
the Court.
The defendant in error was convicted of
willfully refusing to make a return of his net income as required by the
Revenue Act of 1921, Act Nov. 23, 1921, c. 136, §§ 223(a), 253 (42 Stat. 227,
250, 268 (Comp. St. §§ 6336 1/8 kk, 6336 1/8 v)). The judgment was
reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Sullivan v. United States, 15
F.(2d) 809. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.
We may take it that the defendant had
sufficient gross income to require a return under the statute unless he was
exonerated by the fact that the whole or a large part of it was derived from
business in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. § 10138 1/4 et
seq.). The Circuit Court of Appeals held that gains from illicit traffic
in liquor were subject to the income tax, but that the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution protected the defendant from the requirement of a return.
The Court below was right in holding that the
defendant's gains were subject to the tax. By section 213(a), being Comp.
St. § 6336 1/8 ff, gross income includes 'gains, profits, and income derived
from * * * the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or
gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.' These
words are also those of the earlier Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, section II,
B (38 Stat. 114, 167), except that the word 'lawful' is omitted before
'business' in the passage just quoted. By section 600 (42 Stat. 285
(Comp. St. § 5986e)), and by another Act approved on the same day Congress
applied other tax laws to this forbidden traffic. Act Nov. 23, 1921, c.
134, § 5 (42 Stat. 222, 223 (Comp. St. §§ 10138 4/5 c-10138 1/5 e)).
United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, 327, 47 S. Ct. 154, 47 A. L. R.
1025; [FN1] United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477, 480, 43 S. Ct. 197, 67 L.
Ed. 358. We see no reason to doubt the interpretation of the Act, or any
reason why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying
the taxes that if lawful it would have to pay.
As the defendant's income was taxed, the statute
of course required a return. See United States v. Sischo, 262 U. S. 165,
43 S. Ct. 511, 67 L. Ed. 925. In the decision that this was contrary to
the Constitution we are of opinion that the protection of the Fifth Amendment
was pressed too far.
If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was
privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but
could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are
not called on to decide what, if anything, he might have withheld. Most
of the items warranted no compaint. It would be an extreme if not an
extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man
to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime.
But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have
tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon. He could not
draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to
write any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger of the
law. Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 37 S. Ct. 621, 61 L. Ed.
1198; United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration (January 3,
1927) 273 U. S. 103, 47 S. Ct. 302, 71 L. Ed. 560. In this case the
defendant did not even make a declaration, he simply abstained from making a
return. See further the decision of the Privy Council, Minister of
Finance v. Smith (1927) A. C. 193.
It is urged that if a return were made the
defendant would be entitled to deduct illegal expenses such as bribery.
This by no means follows but it will be time enough to consider the question
when a taxpayer has the temerity to raise it.
Judgment reversed.
Footnotes:
FN1 71 L.
Ed. 279.